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ABSTRACT
The antitrust laws of the United States have, from their inception, allowed
firms to acquire significant market power, to charge prices that reflect that market
power, and to enjoy supra-competitive returns. This article shows that this policy,
which was established by the U.S. Congress and affirmed repeatedly by the U.S.
courts, reflects a tradeoff between the dynamic benefits that society realizes from
allowing firms to secure significant rewards, including monopoly profits, from
making risky investments and engaging in innovation; and the static costs that
society incurs when firms with significant market power raise price and curtail
output. That tradeoff results in antitrust laws that allow competition in the market
and for the market, even if that rivalry results in a single firm emerging as a
monopoly, but that prevent firms from engaging in practices that go out of bounds.
The antitrust laws ultimately regulate the ―boundaries‖ of the ―game of competition.‖
Three implications follow. First, the antitrust laws and intellectual property laws are
based on similar policy tradeoffs between static and dynamic effects. Second, the
antitrust rules have, all along, been based on this tradeoff and not on the effects of
business practices on static consumer welfare in relevant antitrust markets. Third, one
unintended consequence of the increased role of economics in antitrust analysis is to
overemphasize static considerations which the almost the sole focus of the economics
literature that courts and competition authorities consider.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The antitrust laws of the United States have never prohibited a firm from
having a monopoly as such or from enjoying the fruits of monopoly except in special
circumstances. This observation is not new.1 But its consequences for the objectives
of antitrust, for the role of static versus dynamic competition in antitrust law, and for
the debate over the tension between antitrust and intellectual property law are
profound and underappreciated in the literature.
This article draws out the implications of the bedrock principle that neither
monopoly nor its profits are unlawful. We highlight two. First, the U.S. antitrust
laws recognize the role of ―competition for the market‖ as a major source of
innovation, and monopoly profits2 as the desirable rewards for entrepreneurship.
Second, the antitrust laws balance the benefits and costs of static and dynamic
competition in the long run in the overall economy.
These two propositions pull some important additional implications in their
wake. One is that there is no fundamental tension between the policies of antitrust
law and intellectual property law; both balance the benefits and costs of static and
dynamic competition for the economy as a whole. Another is that one cannot
reliably appeal to the consumer-welfare objectives of the antitrust laws to rationalize
legal tests based on examining short-run effects on price and output in relevant
antitrust markets, although there may well be practical and operational reasons for
doing so in the larger framework of antitrust analysis.
The article is organized as follows. Section II briefly summarizes the nature
of the antitrust laws. As other authors have recognized, the antitrust laws are based

1

See e.g., United States v. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911) (―[T]he statute…by the omission of any direct
prohibition against monopoly in the concrete…indicates a consciousness that the freedom of the individual right
to contract…was the most efficient means for the prevention of monopoly‖) (emphasis added). See also PHILIP
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW (3rd ed. 2004).
2
We use the term monopoly for convenience. It should be understood throughout as referring to firms that have
significant market power under U.S. law or a dominant position under EC law.
3
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on the presumption that society benefits from the competitive game among firms.3
The antitrust laws provide some limited rules to prevent firms from playing this game
in ways that could be harmful ultimately.
Section III documents that antitrust policy presumes that it is lawful to have a
monopoly and to enjoy the fruits of that monopoly. It then draws out the
implications of this principle for the tradeoff between static and dynamic efficiency
and to the application of the antitrust laws for developing the ―rules of the game.‖
Section IV considers the antitrust laws of the European Community.
Although the EC Treaty provides for the regulation of monopoly prices, the
European Commission and the Community Courts have been reluctant over the last
50 years to invoke these powers. It is lawful in the EC to have a monopoly and, by
and large, to earn monopoly profits. Most countries follow U.S. or EC competition
law4 and therefore presume that monopolies and monopoly pricing are lawful per se.
Section V shows that antitrust and intellectual property policy share the same
basic objectives. Tension arises mainly because they deal with the tradeoff between
static and dynamic competition from different constitutional, legislative, and caselaw perspectives.
Section VI argues that one can think of antitrust law as following a two-step
process. In the first step, antitrust policy considers the effect of practices on long-run
economy-wide consumer welfare to assess where to draw the boundaries and thus
which practices are clearly lawful or not lawful. In the second step, antitrust policy
considers whether particular practices near those boundaries are lawful or not based
on a fact-intensive inquiry. The traditional competitive effects analysis of examining
the impact of a practice on price and output in a relevant antitrust market provides a
method for assessing these close calls.
Section VII argues that the increasing use of economic analysis in
competition policy tends to shift the focus away from dynamic competition because
most of the economic literature, dating back to the original Chicago work, is based
3

See MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 17-19 (2004). For a discussion of how
competition leads to welfare see id. at 39-53.
4
EINER ELHAUGE & DAMIEN GERADIN, GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS (2007).
4
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on mathematical models of static competition. There is ―static competition bias‖ that
affects how economists analyze antitrust problems. This section also argues that the
current industrial organization literature provides limited insights into the tradeoff
between static and dynamic competition that is at the heart of how the courts,
properly, think about the design of competition rules.
Section VIII makes some brief concluding observations. The article argues
that the antitrust laws were designed to promote long-run economic welfare in the
economy and have long recognized the importance of allowing firms to obtain
monopolies and its rewards for achieving that objective. That has led the courts to
establish boundaries for the game of competition and rules for assessing whether
these boundaries have been crossed. This article should not be read as arguing that
the recognition of the importance of dynamic considerations, in the foundations of
antitrust law, necessarily provides a basis for moving those boundaries or modifying
those rules in either the US or EC. But it does caution against relying on static
economic analysis in determining where those boundaries should lie and in devising
rules to assess whether those boundaries have been crossed.

II. COMPETITION RULES
The Supreme Court significantly shaped the antitrust laws of the United
States during the first quarter century after the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act
of 1890.5 This culminated in several classic decisions. Trans-Missouri,6 in 1898,
established that judicial interpretations of the Sherman Act would not be based on the
common law of contracts in restraint of trade. Standard Oil,7 in 1911, adopted the

5

Many authors have examined the objectives of the antitrust laws by examining the history antecedents, the
economic environment, and the legislative debate that led to the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.
See the collection of papers THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SHERMAN ACT: THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED YEARS
(Thomas E. Sullivan ed. 1991).
6
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
7
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
5
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rule of reason test while Chicago Board of Trade,8 in 1918, articulated the process
for applying the rule of reason test. 9 United States Steel,10 in 1921, clarified the
limits of Sherman Act Section 2 in its application to monopolies. Some thought that
the courts had taken too lenient a view on anticompetitive practices in the first two
decades following the Sherman Act. That view led to the passage of the Clayton Act
in 1914 which proscribed particular practices including price discrimination,
exclusive dealing, and tying under certain circumstances.
From their inception, at the federal level, in 1890 the antitrust laws soon
evolved into a process for regulating the competitive process lightly.11 Certain kinds
of concerted action such as price fixing were prohibited. Other business behavior
could be unlawful if it could be demonstrated that the firm had significant market
power and it engaged in practices that were seen as restricting competition. As a
practical matter though, most businesses, including very large and powerful ones,
could engage in an almost limitless range of practices that did not run afoul of the
antitrust laws to make profit, fend off competitors, and increase their market shares.
One can see the role of the antitrust laws in the American economy in several
ways. From 1890 to 1997, the U.S. Department of Justice filed 1,134 civil antitrust
cases, or about 11 per year.12 One estimate suggests only about 20 percent of Justice
Department cases were for monopolization or exclusionary practices claims; the
remainder concerned merger and horizontal per se claims.13 That implies that roughly
2 cases a year involving monopolization or exclusionary practices claims. The same
study found only about one-third to one-quarter of Justice Department cases were

8

Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
The rule of reason and per se distinctions were further refined in Trenton Potteries case of 1927. United States
v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). The boundaries of these rules were not clarified until United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). See, e.g., KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW:
ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMMON LAW EVOLUTION 90-111 (2003).
10
United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
11
John Vickers, Abuse of Market Power, 115 ECON. J. F224 (2005).
12
Joseph Gallo et. al., Department of Justice Antitrust Enforcement, 1955–1997: An Empirical Study 17 REV.
INDUS. ORG. 75, 90 (2000). Of these, 82, were classified as having criminal as well as civil components.
13
Detailed breakdowns by type of violation have been compiled for the 1955 to 1997 period. About 38 percent of
civil cases filed by the Justice Department during this period were for horizontal per se claims (e.g., price fixing,
bid rigging, and market/territory/customer allocation schemes) and about 42 percent were for merger violation
claims. About 8 percent of cases were monopolization claims and about 12 percent were exclusionary practices
claims (e.g., predatory pricing, price discrimination, tying, and exclusive dealing). Id. at 95.
9
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filed against Fortune 500 firms.14 The FTC filed 1,061 cases between 1915 and 1969,
for an average of about 19 per year.15 The antitrust enforcement agencies in the
United States have engaged in relatively modest enforcement activities when viewed
over long periods of time.
The number of private antitrust cases that were filed varied from 452 to 1528
in the 29 year period from 1971-1999.16 By way of comparison the number of
corporate tax returns varied from about 360,000 in 1926 to around 497,000 in 1947
to about 4.7 million in 1997.17 The size distribution of businesses roughly follows
the 80:20 rule,18 in which case the number of businesses that accounted for 80
percent of output varied from 72,000 to 814,000 between 1926 and 1999. If we
assume that the antitrust cases filed only against the firms in the top quintile, the
number of private antitrust suits per business ranged from a high of about 1 in 293
firms in 1977 to a low of about 1 in 1770 in 1997. It is important to keep in mind in
considering all of these statistics that these antitrust cases only pertain to certain
business practices that the companies sued engaged in. The likelihood that any
particular business practice used by a firm with significant market power is
challenged is almost certainly quite small.19
To presage the theme of the next section, the antitrust laws did not preclude
the existence of large corporations that dominate their industries after 1890 although
they certainly reined in some of the excesses of the latter 19th century. We have seen
no statistics but in our experience many groupings of products that would ordinarily
14

Between 1955 and 1997, for which more detailed data have been compiled, cases against Fortune 500 firms
accounted for 454 of 1,348 cases based on one tabulation, and 631 of 2,689 cases by a second tabulation. Id. at
78. These tabulations include both civil and criminal cases. Data on cases against Fortune 500 firms are not
available separately for civil versus criminal filings.
15
RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 45 (2nd ed. 2001). To our knowledge, additional detail on the types of cases
and defendants, or for other time periods, have not been compiled for FTC cases.
16
Id. at 46. Many of these private antitrust cases were against the same defendant over the same issue and many
of these involved price fixing. See id. at 47. Note that Posner also report data for the 1960-1964 period; the
minimum and maximum number of private antitrust cases in this is period are 228 and 2005 respectively. 1739
out of the 2005 cases that occurred in 1962 were against electrical-equipment conspirators.
17
US CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (various years).
18
Robert Axtell, Firm Sizes: Facts, Formulae, Fables and Fantasies (Center on Social and Economic Dynamics
Working Paper No. 44, 2006), arguing that size distribution of U.S. firms approximate a Pareto distribution.
19
We also recognize that the antitrust laws can have a significant effect in deterring business practices because of
the fear of antitrust liability, which would not be captured in the number of cases filed. Such effects are inherently
difficult to quantify. We believe the point remains that firms have a lot of latitude in choosing business practices
that do not trigger antitrust scrutiny.
7
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be defined as a relevant antitrust market have at least one firm with significant
market power.20
The antitrust laws provide for a sort of referee process for the game of
competition.21 The focus is on tactics rather than outcomes. The federal enforcement
agencies and private litigants can challenge the tactics taken by a business, such as
exclusive dealing, and try to prove to the courts that those tactics should not be
allowed. The courts can impose fines and penalties for businesses whose actions have
gone out of bounds. While businesses whose actions have been condemned may see
a heavy hand, as Standard Oil and AT&T did at opposite ends of the 20th century, the
antitrust laws have made relatively modest intrusion into laissez-faire competition.
So that is what antitrust is. It is worth emphasizing what it is not.
Antitrust law is not similar to public utility regulation that was designed to
prevent certain companies that were deemed to have monopolies from charging
excessive prices or earning too much profit. In fact, none of the U.S. antitrust
statutes provides for any direct regulation of the prices charged by, or profits earned,
by monopolies. U.S. courts are highly averse to using the antitrust laws to regulate
prices even as a remedy for violating the antitrust laws.22
Antitrust law only concerns certain business actions that fall within its
ambit.23 It is only for these actions that courts will inquire into their effect on
consumer welfare. Thus, a firm with significant market power can raise prices, refuse
to adhere to standards, cease production of goods and services, and engage in many
other tactics that could be shown to reduce consumer welfare in the short run or the
20

There would appear to have been periods where aggregate concentration in the U.S. economy, and/or of the
relative importance of the largest firms in the U.S. economy, have increased, but the pattern is not systematic
based on available data. Measuring concentration at an aggregate level is difficult. The available data are
typically reported for markets that do not conform to antitrust markets. In addition, there are a number of other
data and measurement shortcomings, such as the growing importance of exports for US firms. For more details on
this, see Lawrence J. White, What's Been Happening To Aggregate Concentration in the United States? (And
Should We Care?) (NYU Economics Working Papers, Working Paper No. 02-03, 2001); F.M. SCHERER & DAVID
ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 59-62 (3rd ed. 1990).
21
See e.g., Thurman Arnold, Antitrust Law Enforcement, Past and Future, 7 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1940).
22
One classic statement of this aversion was Judge Wyzanski‘s discussion of the remedy imposed in United
States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953). Wyzanski expressed reluctance to
regulate United‘s pricing because such an effort would turn United ―into a public utility, and the Court into a
public utility commission.‖ Id. at 349. Wyzanski also noted that an injunction against United Shoe‘s price
discrimination could not be enforced.
23
See Herbert Hovenkamp, BLACK LETTER ON ANTITRUST (1993). Hovenkamps dedicates a chapter to each type
of business action that is subjected to antitrust law.
8
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long run in a relevant antitrust markets or in the economy overall. It is at best
shorthand, and not really correct, to say that ―the purpose of antitrust is to maximize
consumer welfare‖ except in the long-run economy-wide sense that we describe
below. In practice, consumer welfare may provide the tie-breaker for those practices
that the courts agree should be subject to antitrust scrutiny at all.24
That fact emphasizes the distinction between the economics of antitrust, and
the law of antitrust. Modern economic models can establish whether certain business
practices could reduce consumer or social welfare in the short run under certain
assumptions. They can also be used to examine whether certain practices reduce
consumer or social welfare in the factual context of a case. Modern economic models
do not generally provide the courts with much help, however, for assessing whether a
practice should be subject to antitrust scrutiny. Indeed, the same basic models that
show that cartel price fixing reduces social welfare also show that monopoly pricing
reduces social welfare. These models therefore over-identify anticompetitive
practices.25 The discipline of economics helps inform the application of antitrust
analysis by the antitrust authorities and the courts. The antitrust laws themselves are
based on a series of judgments made by the various branches of government, and
especially the courts, concerning the role that the antitrust laws and institutions
should play in regulating the market economy.
That leaves the question of why the United States has adopted this particular
approach for regulating the competitive process and what series of judgments lie, at
least implicitly, behind this approach.

24

It is well recognized that the courts do not seek to prohibit monopoly pricing or other exercises of monopoly
power. See, e.g., Verizon v. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). But courts do commonly attempt to assess the
effect on consumer welfare of those practices that are subject to review. See, e.g., John E. Lopatka & William H.
Page, ‘Obvious’ Consumer Harm in Antitrust Policy: The Chicago School, the Post-Chicago School and the
Courts, in POST-CHICAGO DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST LAW 129, 129-132 (Antonio Cucinotta et. al., eds.2002)
25
Economists typically rely on factors outside their formal models to rationalize judicial decisions that have made
some practices but not others subject to the antitrust laws. These factors include error costs, judicial costs, and
effects on the incentives to innovate. See David S. Evans, Economics and the Design of Competition Law, in
ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 99 (D. W. Collins ed., 2008); Ronald A. Cass & Kieth N. Hylton,
Preserving Competition: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards and Microsoft, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1 (1999);
Frank Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1981).
9
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III. THE OBJECTIVE AND PREMISE OF U.S. ANTITRUST LAW
Previous works on the objectives of the antitrust laws have taken one of two
approaches. A number of authors have tried to ascertain the ―objective function‖ of
antitrust from the legislative history of the Sherman Act.26 Robert Bork, in perhaps
the most influential work of this genre, has argued that Congress intended the
Sherman Act to maximize consumer welfare.27 Some scholars have also relied on
the legislative history to argue that Congress had other objectives in mind such as the
protection of small businesses.28 Other authors have concentrated on examining
what the objectives of the antitrust laws should be. Older debates have surrounded
whether the antitrust laws should focus entirely on consumer welfare rather than
redistribution of wealth and other possible objectives. More recent discussions have
focused on whether antitrust should seek to maximize consumer welfare or total
welfare.29
A.

A Revealed Preference Approach to the Objectives of the Antitrust Law
We take a different approach based on what economists call revealed

preference.30 Suppose, for the same price and length of time, a consumer can go to

26

An objective function refers to what decisionmakers are seeking to maximize. Economists assume that
consumers maximize a utility function which is based on their preferences for different goods and services subject
to their budget constraints. Economists assume that businesses are maximizing a profit function. Economists
ordinarily assume that a benevolent social planner would maximize social welfare.
27
Bork writes ―… the policy the courts were intended to apply is the maximization of wealth or consumer want
satisfaction. This requires courts to distinguish between agreements or activities that increase wealth through
efficiency and those that decrease it through restriction of output.‖ See Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the
Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J. L. & ECON. 7 (1966). We agree with Bork that the legislative intent of the Sherman
Act was broadly to advance consumer welfare. Bork‘s analysis, including his quotes from Senator Sherman,
illustrates some of the confusion in the subsequent literature. It mixes statements and concepts that correspond to
classic static welfare maximization with those that correspond to dynamic total welfare maximization. For
example, in a typical passage Bork notes that ―[c]ongress was very concerned that the law should not interfere
with business efficiency. This concern, which was repeatedly stressed, was so strong that it led Congress to agree
that monopoly itself was lawful if it was gained and maintained only by superior efficiency.‖ Id. at 12.
28
Lande argues that wealth transfer was the original objective. See Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the
Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Economic Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.
J. 65 (1982). Hovenkamp argues that the protection of small businesses was a key objective. See Herbert
Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1989).
29
See e.g., Joe Farrell & Michael Katz, The Economics of Welfare Standards in Antitrust, 2 COMP. POL‘Y INT‘L 3
(2006); Ken Heyer, Welfare Standards and Merger Analysis: Why Not the Best? 2 COMP. POL‘Y INT‘L 29 (2006).
30
For a text that covers revealed preference, see ANDREU MAS-COLLEL ET. AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 14
(1995).
10
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an opera or have dinner followed by a movie. The consumer chooses dinner and the
movie. The consumer has revealed something about the underlying utility function
she is seeking to maximize subject to her budget constraint: the combination of
dinner and the movie dominates opera. In the case of antitrust law we examine what
choices the courts and other branches of government have made. From those choices
we infer something about the objective function that those policymakers are
maximizing.
The following broad choices have emerged from the U.S. antitrust laws:
It is lawful for a firm to have significant market power.31
It is lawful for a firm to engage in a multitude of practices that help it
acquire significant market power.
It is unlawful for a firm to engage in certain practices that help it acquire
or maintain significant market power.32
It is lawful for a firm to engage in a multitude of practices that enable it to
maintain significant market power including holding on to a monopoly.
It is unlawful for a firm to collude with other firms over setting prices and
other market parameters.
It is normally unlawful to acquire significant market power through a
merger, acquisition, or joint venture.
These choices reveal several aspects of the underlying purpose of the antitrust laws.
First, the proscribed and permitted activities are not consistent with the view
that the antitrust laws are seeking to maximize static consumer or social welfare in a
relevant antitrust market. We know from the basic monopoly welfare loss triangle
shown in Figure 1 that greater market power results in consumers paying higher
prices, obtaining less output, and receiving less consumer surplus than they would
with lesser market power. Greater market power also results in lower social surplus
since the exercise of market power results in units of output not being produced for
which the value of the output to consumers is greater than the cost to society of
producing that output. Yet the antitrust laws provide businesses with wide latitude
for acquiring and exercising significant market power.
31

Significant market power includes the extreme case of having a monopoly.
Over time the courts have changed their views on whether certain practices should be treated under a per se rule
of the rule of reason and have made some practices that could have been the basis for antitrust liability either per
se lawful or presumptively lawful.
32

11
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FIGURE 1
MONOPOLY PRICING AND CONSUMER WELFARE

Second, the proscribed and permitted activities are not consistent with the
view that the antitrust laws are seeking to maximize dynamic consumer or social
welfare in a relevant antitrust market – in the sense of fostering a process of
Schumpterian creative destruction in that market. Firms can exercise significant
market power over long periods of time. They can do so even if they obtained that
market power through luck or government-backed barriers to entry. The antitrust
laws provide no facility for restraining dominant firms from charging high prices and
earning significant profits. Firms with significant market power can also engage in a
variety of actions that help them maintain that power such as advertising, various
loyalty schemes, and obtaining patents.33 They can, in practice, erect numerous
33

In California Computer Products v. International Business Machines, 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979), the court
ruled that limiting monopolist right to engage in R&D would harm technological progress. In SCM Corp. v.
Xerox Corp., 507 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1974), the court ruled that accumulating patents, no matter how many, is not
12
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barriers, or benefit from ones that occur naturally such as network effects, that in
effect deter entry.
Third, the proscribed and permitted activities are not consistent with other
objectives that have been ascribed to the antitrust laws. They provide only limited
relief to small businesses. Larger firms can increase their market shares and in the
course of doing so put smaller firms out of business through many lawful means.
Small businesses can seek protection only if these larger firms engage in a relatively
limited number of practices that have been deemed anticompetitive. More generally,
the antitrust laws do not pursue a populist objective function. They do not allow the
redistribution of income from firms with significant market power to other parts of
society. Nor do they provide a forceful tool for preventing the significant
agglomeration of significant economic—and perhaps with it political—power.
Before we describe the objective function that, we argue, is behind the
antitrust laws it is helpful to take a brief detour into the political debate that led to the
passage of the Sherman Act and influenced its early evolution.
B.

Monopoly Power and the Early History of Antitrust
There is no dispute that the Sherman Act was enacted in response to public

concerns over the rapid rise of very large firms and certain practices that those firms
engaged in with respect to their rivals and to other businesses.34 There were diverse
views, however, on the extent to which the consolidation of American industry was a
problem and how the country should deal with it.35
The Democratic party of the time took the position that there is no good
monopoly. Williams Jennings Bryan, the Democratic nominee for the Presidency in
1890, said,

itself illegal. See also, California Dental Association v. FTC 526 U.S. 756 (1999) holding that prohibitions to
advertise were not a form of cartelization; Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977)
discussing exclusive territories; State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3 (1997), discussing resale price maintenance.
34
See, e.g., PHILIP AREEDA ET. AL., ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES 34-35 (2004).
35
Historian Richard Hofstadter provides a helpful summary which we draw upon. See Richard Hofstadter, What
Happened to the Antitrust Movement, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SHERMAN ACT: THE FIRST ONE
HUNDRED YEARS 20 (Thomas E. Sullivan ed. 1991).
13
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I do not divide monopolies in private hands into good monopolies and
bad monopolies. There is no good monopoly in private hands. There
can be no good monopoly in private hands until the Almighty sends us
angels to preside over the monopoly.36
The Democratic platform of 1900 asserted:
Private monopolies are indefensible and intolerable ….. They are the
most efficient means yet devised for appropriating the fruits of
industry to the benefit of the few at the expense of the many, and
unless their insatiate greed is checked, all wealth will be aggregated in
a few hands the Republic destroyed.37
Advocates for the powerful trusts took the opposite view, though they were
comparatively reticent to speak in the face of hostile public opinion.38 The near
absence, in Congress, of strong vocal opposition to the Sherman Act may have
reflected a perception on the part of opponents that the statute would be innocuous
and yet at the same time dampen demands for more radical efforts to regulate the
trusts.39 The strongest statement against the principle of the Sherman Act was
offered by Senator Platt of Connecticut:40

Unrestricted competition is brutal warfare, and injurious to the whole
country… The true theory of this matter is that prices, no matter who
is the producer or what the article, should be such as will render a fair
return to all persons engaged in its production, a fair profit on capital,
on labor, and on everything else that enters into its production… I
believe that every man in business… has a right, a legal and moral
right, to obtain a fair profit upon his business and his work; and if he
is driven by fierce competition to a spot where his business is
36

Williams Jennings Bryan, The Man before the Dollar: Society Not Enthralled to the Institution Solely Because
the Institution Exists: The Remedy of Congressional License in CHICAGO CONFERENCE ON TRUSTS: SPEECHES,
DEBATES, RESOLUTIONS, LIST OF THE DELEGATES, COMMITTEES, ECT., 497 (1900).
37
TRIBUNE ASSOCIATION, THE TRIBUNE ALMANAC AND POLITICAL REGISTER 1901, 65 (1901).
38
WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT,
54-55 (1981).
39
HANS THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION 215 (1955).
40
Id. at 198. The most vocal critic of Senator Sherman‘s proposed antitrust statute was Senator James George,
see LETWIN, supra note 38, at 89. However, George did not object to the principle of the Sherman Act. George
attacked the statute as unconstitutional and ineffective, though Bork‘s account suggests that George also believed
that the trusts sometimes hurt small businesses by offering superior products, or lower prices attained through
scale economies. Bork, supra note 27, at 17; see also, LETWIN, supra note 38, at 89-90 (describing George‘s
critique of the Sherman‘s bill for its inability to distinguish desirable combinations from undesirable
combinations, its unconstitutionality, and its ineffectiveness.)
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unremunerative, I believe it is his right to combine for the purpose of
raising prices until they shall be fair and remunerative.41
Both extreme views were rejected when it came to adopting an antitrust
policy. Instead, Congress passed legislation that put more teeth into the common law
treatment of monopoly. The common law had historically refused to enforce
contracts that were unreasonable restraints of trade (the classic case is Davenant v.
Hurdis in which the tailor guild required that half of all cloth finishing for its
members must be done by its members) and prohibited monopolies that had been
acquired in certain ways (the classic case being the Queen‘s grant of a monopoly in
playing cards in Darcy v. Allen).42 Instead of just dissolving illegally acquired
monopoly and refusing to enforce restraints on trade, Congress provided for a system
of criminal punishment that later evolved into a system of competition-based torts.43
William Letwin, in his classic work44 on the origins of the Sherman Act,
argues that this approach can be seen as recognizing that both competition and
monopoly had their place in the economic system.45
The economists thought that both competition and combination46
should play their parts in the economy. The lawyers saw that the
common law permitted combination in some instances and prohibited
it in others. Congressmen seized on this hidden agreement, and set
out to construct a statute which by the use of common-law principles
would eliminate excesses but allow ‗healthy‘ competition and
combination to flourish side by side.

41

THORELLI supra note 39, at 198.
1 Clode, Early History of the Guild of Merchant Taylors 393-94 (1888); 11 Coke 84, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B.
1603); see also DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 632 (4th ed.
2004)
43
The Sherman Act is a criminal statute. The right to bring a private action may have been implied, but did not
become clear until the passage of the Clayton Act in 1914. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides for private
actions for treble damages. See, e.g., Hylton, supra note 9, at 47-60.
44
LETWIN, supra note 38, at 85.
45
At least some of the leading economists of the day were dubious about the whole antitrust enterprise. Richard
Ely, who was the founder of the American Economic Association and the leader of a group of economists who
rebelled against the laissez-faire tradition, seems to have recognized the loss of efficiencies in breaking up
combinations such as the railroads and the need for direct regulation of prices. See RICHARD ELY ET. AL.,
OUTLINES OF ECONOMICS 153 (2nd ed. 1912).
46
The word ―combination‖ was used at the time to refer to firms that had become large through internal growth as
well as through mergers.
42
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Robert Bork has argued that Congress intended that the Sherman Act would
outlaw practices that harmed consumer welfare.47 He seems to have in mind static
consumer welfare which falls when firms reduce output below the efficient level.48
That strikes us as an overly simplistic interpretation and one that is not consistent
with either the actual law or its subsequent implementation. Any firm that has
market power restricts output below the level that an economic engineer seeking to
maximize consumer welfare would set. Monopolies cause the greatest loss in
consumer welfare all else equal. There is no economic reason why anyone seeking to
maximize static consumer welfare would prohibit cartels from engaging in price
fixing that may lead to a monopoly price but allow monopolies to set a price that
leads to a similar welfare loss.49 One can attempt to reconcile this stark distinction by
appealing to a multitude of factors including the dynamic ones considered below.
But these explanations lead inevitably to frameworks in which static consumer
welfare maximization is, at best, one element. And these factors are usually brought
in as deus ex machina to reconcile what are facially inconsistent results.
Since the passage of the Sherman Act there have been periodic attempts to
revisit the extent to which the antitrust laws should deal with the ―monopoly
problem.‖ The most famous, as well as the most successful, is the legislative
package enacted in 1914, the Clayton Act and FTC Act. The Clayton Act directed
courts to apply a more rigid legal test – a type of per se rule – to tying, exclusive
dealing, and price discrimination.50 The FTC Act created the Federal Trade
Commission and gave it power to prosecute ―unfair methods of competition‖, which
might be difficult to pursue under the Sherman Act because of the evidentiary
requirements.51 Both statutes sought to tighten the constraints on monopoly firms.
The Clayton Act, as originally interpreted, did so by removing certain practices from
47

See Bork, supra note 27.
Bork tends to equate anticompetitive practices as ones that reduce output and, although this is sometimes
vague, in relevant antitrust markets.
49
That was especially the case for the early years of the antitrust laws. The independent railroads that formed
combinations were early targets. Without judging the issue one can easily come up with reasons with these
combinations increased consumer welfare by permitting coordination of traffic over a network or disciplining
inefficient price wars resulting from railroads having high fixed sunk cost investments and low marginal costs.
ELY, supra note 45, states that breaking up these combinations had unfortunate consequences.
50
For a general description, see HYLTON, supra note 9, at 47-48.
51
Id.
48
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the rule of reason framework established in Standard Oil. The FTC Act tightened
constraints by creating an alternative enforcer that could pursue potentially
anticompetitive conduct that was essentially immune because of the demanding
evidentiary requirements of the Sherman Act. Both statutes have been interpreted
more recently in a fashion that harmonizes them with the Sherman Act. More
importantly, though, both statutes and the common law surrounding them have
stayed well within the boundaries of the Sherman Act by taking a light hand to the
monopoly problem.
More serious efforts to revisit the regulation of monopolies have failed to be
enacted as law. For most of the first half of the Sherman Act‘s life, there were
repeated attempts in Congress to enact federal incorporation statutes that would
impose strict competition-based regulations on large corporations.52 The federal
incorporation statutes would have provided a direct route to preventing firms with
monopoly power from either exploiting or enhancing that power through methods
that would not violate the antitrust laws. The last federal incorporation attempt was
the failed 1937 Borah-Mahoney bill that would have required corporations operating
in interstate commerce to be licensed by the Federal Trade Commission.53
In response to recommendations of the White House Task Force on Antitrust
Policy (Neal Report), Congress considered a statute that would require the
restructuring of oligopolistic industries in 1971, and another statute that would
require dissolution of monopolies in 1973.54 As recently as 1979, the National
Commission for the Review of the Antitrust Laws and Procedures proposed that the
Sherman Act be amended to permit the government to seek dissolution in the absence
of a finding of monopolization under Section 2.55
There has therefore been a consensus among the judicial and legislative
branch of governments, for more than a century, that whatever evils monopoly may
bring, society would be worse off regulating or preventing firms from seeking,
obtaining, and exercising monopoly power.
52

Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism 96 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2008)
Id. at.23-25.
54
See, e.g., AREEDA ET. AL., supra note 34, at 418.
55
Crane, supra note 52, at 26.
53
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There have also been periods in which the courts or antitrust enforcement
agencies have taken a more hands-off approach. Posner‘s statistical study suggests
that the Department of Justice was relatively quiet on antitrust matters from roughly
1910 to the late 1930s.56 The Reagan administration introduced a shift in priorities
away from monopolization cases that has continued in subsequent Republican
administrations. But this variation has happened along a line that was drawn far
away from regulating the outcomes of the competitive struggle among businesses
including ones that lead to monopoly.
C.

What the Courts Have Said about Monopoly
To see how the courts have viewed firms with significant market power it is

helpful to start with a decision that appears midway in the history of U.S. antitrust
and is often viewed as one of the least friendly to firms that sit on enormous market
shares: Judge Learned Hand‘s famous opinion in U.S. v. Alcoa.57 The lower court
had ruled against the government on the grounds that, although it had shown that
Alcoa had a monopoly, it had failed to prove that Alcoa had engaged in
anticompetitive conduct. Hand‘s opinion overturned the lower court and found that
Alcoa had violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. He embraced the view that
the purpose of the Sherman Act, and other government policy, ―was to perpetuate
and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an organization of
industry in small units which can effectively compete with each other.‖ He
emphasized that Alcoa‘s sheer size enhanced it ability to engage in abuse.
Judge Hand also accepted, however, that there was nothing wrong with
monopoly as the outcome of the competitive process. His views on this are worth
quoting in full rather than just the famous last line:
Nevertheless, it is unquestionably true that from the very outset the
courts have at least kept in reserve the possibility that the origin of a
monopoly may be critical in determining its legality; and for this they
56

Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J. L. & ECON. 365, 368 (1970).
Alcoa was decided by the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals, on which Hand sat, because too many of the members
of the Supreme Court had to recuse themselves.
57
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had warrant in some of the congressional debates which accompanied
the passage of the Act. This notion has usually been expressed by
saying that size does not determine guilt; that there must be some
"exclusion" of competitors; that the growth must be something else
than "natural" or "normal"; that there must be a "wrongful intent," or
some other specific intent; or that some "unduly" coercive means must
be used. At times there has been emphasis upon the use of the active
verb, "monopolize," as the judge noted in the case at bar. What
engendered these compunctions is reasonably plain; persons may
unwittingly find themselves in possession of a monopoly,
automatically so to say: that is, without having intended either to put
an end to existing competition, or to prevent competition from arising
when none had existed; they may become monopolists by force of
accident. Since the Act makes "monopolizing" a crime, as well as a
civil wrong, it would be not only unfair, but presumably contrary to
the intent of Congress, to include such instances. A market may, for
example, be so limited that it is impossible to produce at all and meet
the cost of production except by a plant large enough to supply the
whole demand. Or there may be changes in taste or in cost which
drive out all but one purveyor. A single producer may be the survivor
out of a group of active competitors, merely by virtue of his superior
skill, foresight and industry. In such cases a strong argument can be
made that, although the result may expose the public to the evils of
monopoly, the Act does not mean to condemn the resultant of those
very forces which it is its prime object to foster: finis opus coronat.
The successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be
turned upon when he wins.
As Hand summarizes the state of antitrust jurisprudence in 1945 there is
nothing unlawful about obtaining monopolies by ―superior skill, foresight and
industry.‖ The monopoly is the ―end that crowns the work‖ (finis opus coronat). Nor
is there anything troubling if a firm gets the monopoly through ―accident.‖ This view
echoes Supreme Court decisions that stretch back through the previous half century
of antitrust. The most prominent pre-Alcoa monopolization decisions, Standard Oil
and U.S. Steel, stress the distinction between lawful and unlawful methods of gaining
monopoly power.58 Indeed, the law was much more protective of monopolization
efforts before Alcoa, because the courts required evidence of ―specific intent‖ to

58

See, e.g., AREEDA ET. AL., supra note 34, at 368-372; HYLTON, supra note 9, at 186-188.
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monopolize.59 Judge Hand‘s key change in the law of monopolization was to scrap
the specific intent requirement. This was justified in his view because a monopolist,
merely by setting his price at the monopoly level, causes the same harm to consumers
as cartels do.
Antitrust law has moved far way from many of the anti-big business views
expressed by Judge Hand in Alcoa. However, his analysis of why monopolies that
win the competition for the market through superior skill, foresight and industry have
not violated the antitrust laws merely because of their success has become the
standard treatment. All subsequent Section 2 decisions have embraced this view.
Indeed, the fundamental test for monopolization, adopted after the Alcoa decision,
requires the possession of monopoly power and ―the willful acquisition or
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historical accident...‖60 The
variation observed in the post-Alcoa case law is not over whether lawful
monopolization exists, but precisely how to define the boundary between lawful and
unlawful monopolization. Alcoa opened the door for courts to define a much larger
set of activities as unlawful than would have been permissible under the pre-Alcoa
law. But courts have for the most part been conservative in accepting Alcoa‘s
invitation. They have looked for practices that seem to raise a special risk of
maintaining monopoly – such as the lock-in contracts condemned by Judge
Wyzanski in United Shoe.61 And more recently courts have come close, in the areas
of predatory pricing (Brooke Group)62 and essential facilities (Trinko)63, to returning
to the specific intent requirement of the pre-Alcoa law.64
D.

Competition Rules
The antitrust laws are based on an objective and a premise.

59

See, e.g., HYLTON, supra note 9, at 187-192.
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-1 (1966).
61
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), Aff‘d Per Curiam, 347 U.S.
521 (1954).
62
Brooke Group Ltd. V. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
63
Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
64
See, e.g., HYLTON, supra note 9, at 202-219.
60
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The objective is economic progress broadly defined or, in the language of
economics, long-run economy-wide consumer welfare. We believe the choices made
by the legislatures and the courts are consistent with their focusing on maximizing
the performance of the economy, for the benefit of consumers, over long periods of
time. We cannot conceive of their revealed preferences being consistent with any
other objective function.
The premise is that the competitive process can generally be relied on to
maximize long-run economy-wide consumer welfare. The pursuit of the crown of
monopoly has been accepted by the courts and implicitly by the legislature as an
important aspect of the competitive process. So much so, in fact, that the courts and
legislature do not even want to distinguish a monopoly that arrives through
―accident‖ versus one that arrives through superior skill.
In light of this objective and premise, the courts tend to proscribe business
practices only when they become confident that these practices interfere with
economic progress. That involves identifying situations in which (a) the costs that
consumers incur over time from the exercise of market power in relevant markets are
substantial and outweigh (b) the dynamic social benefits that the economy receives
from allowing firms to receive monopoly profits as a reward for successful
competition for markets. This tradeoff is between local costs (i.e. from those
incurred in relevant antitrust markets) and global benefits (i.e. from stimulating
investment and innovation in the overall economy).65 Hardcore cartels are prohibited
because the courts—and the U.S. Congress in passing the Sherman Act—have
judged that the monopoly profits from cartels do not provide dynamic economy-wide
social benefits that could offset the consumer welfare loss in relevant markets.66 This
65

To be precise the tradeoffs are between the effect of prohibiting practices on consumer welfare loss in relevant
antitrust markets including the deterrence effects of prohibiting those practices and the effect of those prohibitions
on the incentives for making risky investments that could increase long-run consumer welfare in a variety of
ways.
66
This judgment seems right to us but is not based on rigorous economic theory or empirical work. The prospect
of sharing in cartel profits could induce entry and innovation in many of the same ways as the prospect of
obtaining unilateral monopoly profits do. Similarly, one could argue that cartels may be necessary in high-fixed
cost oligopolistic industry subject to ruinous competition; see MICHAEL WHINSTON, LECTURES ON ANTITRUST
ECONOMICS 16 (2006). This is an example of one of many aspects of antitrust in which modern economics rather
incompletely informs the policy judgments that necessarily lay at the heart of antitrust law—a subject that we
come to later in this article.
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global versus local tradeoff is central to our thesis and subsumes the more traditional
static versus dynamic efficiency tradeoff.

IV. MONOPOLY IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COMPETITION LAW
Our conclusion that the U.S. antitrust laws have a ―revealed preference‖ for
an objective function that maximizes long-run economy-wide social welfare applies
with some qualification to European Community competition law as well.
We focus our attention on Article 82 of the European Community Treaty
which pertains to abuses of a dominant position.67 Under EC case law a firm has a
dominant position if it ―can hinder the maintenance of effective competition on the
relevant market by allowing it to behave in an appreciable extent independently of its
competitors and customers and ultimately of consumers.‖68 As a practical matter
firms are usually found dominant if they have market shares of 50 percent or more
and sometimes as low as 40 percent.69 One can consider a dominant firm as one that
has significant market power. The European Commission investigates and
determines whether a firm has abused a dominant position. Its decisions can then be
appealed to the European Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice.70

67

The European Community‘s antitrust laws are based on two articles of the Treaty of Rome that established the
EC in 1957. These articles were renumbered in subsequent treaties. Article 81 concerns concerted practices and
is similar to Sherman Section 1 except insofar as Article 81(3) provides an explicit examination of efficiency
rationales for horizontal agreements. The EC‘s treatment of mergers and, coordinated practices are similar to
those in the United States, at least for the purposes of our discussion. For an introduction to EC competition law
generally, see BELLAMY AND CHILD: EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW OF COMPETITION: EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW
th
OF COMPETITION (Peter Roth & Vivien Rose eds., 6 ed. 2008).
68
Case 322/81, Michelin v, Comm‘n, 1983 E.C.R. 03461.
69
In T-219/99, British Airways v. Commission, 2003 E.C.R. II-05917, ¶¶ 211, 225, British Airways was found
dominant in the context of Article 82 with a share which had declined from 46% to just under 40% during the
period of abuse. The finding relied heavily, though, on the fact that the rest of the market was very fragmented.
Subsequently, in Case COMP/38.233, Wanadoo Interactive, 2003, the Commission concluded in paragraph 227
that Wanadoo did hold a dominant position, albeit it only had a market share of 39%. The Commission reached
this finding both based on the size and strength of Wanadoo‘s main competitors,
who all had markets shares in between 6.5% and 16%
70
The EC Member States have their own competition laws which are not covered in this section. The EC
competition laws regulate business practices that involve multiple member states. For more detail, see ROTH &
ROSe, supra note 67.
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Article 82 provides for two sorts of abuses.71 The first are exclusionary
abuses which are similar to those found in U.S. case law. The major difference from
the U.S. is that the EC treats most of these abuses under an essentially per se rule. A
firm has committed an abuse if it is dominant and if it has engaged in the proscribed
practice. Some practices that are seldom prohibited in the U.S. because plaintiffs bear
a stiff burden under a rule-of-reason analysis remain problematic in the EC.
Moreover, the European Commission and the European courts tend to focus on
whether the dominant firm has placed its competitors at an ―unfair advantage.‖72
From the standpoint of a dominant firm conducting business, the differences
regarding exclusionary practices between the United States and the European
Community are, however, matters of degree as well as both secular and cyclical
trends in antitrust thinking.
The second type of abuse is ―exploitative‖ which has no U.S. counterpart. In
listing possible abuses of a dominant position Article 82 includes ―directly or
indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading
conditions….‖73 Thus Article 82 has a specific provision that bars firms that have a
dominant position from charging ―high prices.‖ The European courts have found that
it is unlawful for a dominant firm to charge a price for a product or service that is
excessive relative to its economic value where value is based on the cost of the
product or service or the price of comparable goods.74
However, the European Commission has taken its discretion, as the
prosecutor, of not pursuing ―excessive pricing‖ cases generally. 75 In 1975 the
Commission said that ―measures to halt the abuse of dominant positions cannot be
converted into systematic monitoring or prices.‖ In 1994 the Commission affirmed
that,
71

Neither of these two categories of abuses makes it unlawful for a firm to engage in practices that help it obtain
a dominant position or, to use the Sherman Act phrase, ―to monopolize.‖
72
This is based on influences from the ordo-liberal school. See David Evans & Christian Ahlborn, The Microsoft
Judgment and its Implications for Competition Policy Towards Dominant Firms in Europe (Apr. 2008) (Working
Paper, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1115867); Christian Ahlborn & Carsten Grave, Walter Eucken and
Ordoliberalism: An Introduction from a Consumer Welfare Perspective, 2 COMP. POL‘Y INT‘L 197 (2006).
73
Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 321) Art. 82.
74
Case 27/76, United Brands v Comm‘n, 1978 E.C.R. 00207.
75
ROTH & ROSE, supra note 67, at 9-074.
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The existence of a dominant position is not itself against the rules of
competition. Consumers can suffer from a dominant company
exploiting this position, the most likely way being through prices
higher than would be found if the market were subject to effective
competition. However, the Commission in its decision-making
practice does not normally control or condemn the high level of prices
as such. 76
The Commission‘s most recent decision on excessive pricing—in which it dismissed
two complaints against the Port of Helsingborg by ferry operators—has indicated
little enthusiasm for regulating the prices of dominant firms.77
Perhaps the clearest evidence that the Commission does not prevent dominant
firms from enjoying the fruits of their market power is its approach in its lengthy
investigation of Microsoft. Despite finding that Microsoft has a near monopoly over
computer operating systems the Commission focused on Microsoft practices such as
refusal to supply and tying rather than on Microsoft‘s prices.78 Moreover, the
Commission has not pursued excessive pricing claims against numerous dominant
firms that are undoubtedly charging prices that exceed the cost of provision.79
Overall the European Community has more stringent rules of the game for
firms that achieve significant market power than does the United States. The EC has
per se rules where the U. S. has rule of reason, it finds practices unlawful under its
per se analysis that would not be found unlawful under a rule of reason analysis with
similar facts in the U.S., and it at least allows for the possibility of restraining high
prices. Moreover, for all intents and purposes, the European Commission has had the
final word on abuses under Article 82. In the last 20 years the European Court of

76

The European Commission currently has an investigation against Qualcomm in which the main issue is
whether Qualcomm‘s royalty rates are ―excessive‖. At the time of this writing the Commission has not issued
either a statement of objections or a decision against Qualcomm.
77
Case COMP/A.36.570/D3, Scandlines v Port of Helsingborg, 2004 ¶¶ 52,53.
78
The exception was in seeking to enforce its remedies the Commission asserted that Microsoft‘s royalty rates for
certain licenses were excessive, but even here the main concern was that the royalties would continue to exclude
rivals in the market for server operating systems and that the proposed royalties came from unlawfully acquired
dominance.
79
The main exception to this statement is that the Commission has pursued excessive pricing cases against some
of the formerly state-owned monopolies but it has done so in part as the de facto regulator for these sectors.
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Justice has rejected a decision by the Commission concerning an Article 82 abuse on
a substantive point only once, partially, out of 15 cases.80
However, the EC provides for weaker enforcement of the antitrust laws than
does the U.S. There has been no mechanism for private enforcement of the
competition laws for EC-wide offenses. Private actions remain relatively uncommon,
and difficult to pursue, in most of the member states. Ordinarily, plaintiffs can only
recover actual damages. Some European countries have begun to embrace class
actions of some form and the European Community is considering the role of private
actions going forward. The leading proposals for class actions have specifically
rejected awarding multiples of damages.81 As a result, the EC has higher standards of
behavior for dominant firms but weaker enforcement while the U.S. has lower
standards but stronger enforcement.
As in the U.S., the reality is that most dominant firms, and even monopoly
ones, can engage in many activities that help them obtain significant market power
and exploit that power. The European Commission has issued 17 decisions that find
an Article 82 abuse between 1998 and 2007 for an average of about 2 decisions per
year.82 Firms generally face few constraints in acquiring dominant positions and in
securing the benefits of those positions through various business practices. The hand
seems heavy for those companies that are touched by the EC‘s competition laws
which can seem inflexible and harsh on successful firms. As a practical matter,
though, the European Community follows the United States in regulating the
boundaries of the game of competition but giving firms wide latitude within those
bounds. Companies that win the competitive struggle in the European Community
can generally expect to enjoy the fruits of their efforts: finis opus coronat.83

80

Evans & Ahlborn, supra note 72, at 25.
Commission White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC antitrust rules (April 2008), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_white_paper/whitepaper_en.pdf; UK Office
of Fair Trading, Private actions in competition law: effective redress for consumers and business, Discussion
paper, available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft916.pdf.
82
The EC member states each has a competition authority and these authorities also issue the equivalent of
decisions on abuse of dominance for domestic matters. The United Kingdom‘s Office of Fair Trade is one of the
most active authorities. It issued 90 decisions between 2001 and 2007 regarding violations of Articles 81 and 82.
83
There are some warning signs that this may not continue which we discuss below.
81
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V. RECONCILING ANTITRUST AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW
As with the antitrust laws the intellectual property laws provide firms with
some guarantees that they will receive the prize of monopoly profits in return for
winning at the competitive game.
In most industrialized countries, however, many creations of the human mind
receive no property protection at all.84 Basic mathematical and scientific research
results go into the common pool of knowledge. Albert Einstein obtained protection
for his methods of refrigeration but nothing for his work on the general theory of
relativity. Arguably brilliant business insights such as creating an international chain
of coffeehouses or placing advertising on search results pages receive no protection.
When they are granted, intellectual property rights come with restrictions.
Companies can keep whatever recipes, methods, or insights that they have secret.
While trade secrets law prevents the theft of those secrets they do not prevent others
from reverse engineering or independently discovering the secret. To gain
protections inventors can seek a patent in some circumstances but only in return for
disclosing the invention, and thereby adding to the pool of knowledge, and only for a
limited period of time. For written, spoken, and visual works inventors can obtain a
copyright which provides significant protection from others replicating the works but
also provides for fair use.
Debates have occurred in many countries on whether intellectual property
protection has gone too far or not far enough.85 But the broad consensus in
industrialized countries for the last two centuries has been that when entrepreneurs
must invest in activities that have an uncertain payoff they need to be able to expect
to receive a reward for their efforts. Patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets
establish limited property rights that enable entrepreneurs to receive rewards for
successful products and services. At the same time there has been a broad consensus
84

For an excellent survey of intellectual property policy see ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS
DISCONTENTS - HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO
DO ABOUT IT (2004).
85
Id; see also JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, LAWYERS, AND
BUREAUCRATS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008).
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against establishing property rights over results that require little effort to come up
with or ones that are in some sense too important for scientific progress to limit.
Intellectual property policy in the industrialized world therefore balances the
losses from restricting output in markets against the benefits from providing
incentives for investment and innovation.86 On the one hand it recognizes the
importance of ex post monopoly profits in stimulating innovative effort. That is the
main motivation for granting rights at all. On the other hand it is sensitive to the
inefficiencies that would result from limiting the dissemination of knowledge and the
output of products and services based on that knowledge. While there are legitimate
debates over whether there is too much intellectual property protection it is important
to recognize that a vast portion of ―innovative efforts‖ that could be given protection
are not. In addition to the limitations on scope and duration observed in patent and
copyright statutes, the case law in both fields adheres to a general principle against
awarding property rights for abstract ideas, formulae, or processes that could be
embodied in many different types of innovation or expression.87 These restrictions
place sharp limits on the static welfare costs that could result from the key
intellectual property statutes.
Antitrust law and intellectual property law serve very different policy
purposes.88 The former is designed to regulate the game of competition, while the
latter is designed to establish the proper bounds of property rights over products of
the mind. Nevertheless, they are based on the same fundamental recognition that
profits from securing significant market power serve as a reward for expending effort
on things that will ultimately benefit society and that securing this effort is worth the
price of deviations from the static competitive outcome.

86

See Nancy Gallini & Susan Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?, in,
INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY (Adam B. Jaffe et.al., eds. 2002).
87
See, e.g., O‘Reilly v. Morse, 15 Howard (56 U.S.) 62, 112-113 (1853) (denying patent protection to processes
that could cover both known and unknown applications); Gottshalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (denying
patent for software based on general mathematical algorithm); Mackay Co. v. Radio Corp., 306 U.S. 86, 94
(1939) (scientific truths and their mathematical expressions not patentable).
88
Other authors have reached a similar conclusion although from a somewhat different direction. See Ward S.
Bowman, Patent and Antitrust Law. A Legal and Economic Appraisal, 11 J. ECON. LIT. 1403, 1403-1405; Mark
Lemley, A New Balance Between IP and Antitrust (Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper, Paper No.
340, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=980045.
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Some observers have suggested that there is a fundamental tension between
antitrust law and intellectual property law. The more simplistic analyses claim that
antitrust law is about preventing monopolies while intellectual property law is about
creating monopolies.89 That is quite wrong as we have seen. Antitrust law does not
seek to deter the formation of monopolies based on physical or intellectual property
or based on knowledge that is subject to no property protection at all. It does not
seek to regulate the prices charged or the output produced by firms that secure
significant market, including monopoly, power. Nor does it seek to dismantle or
erode monopolies once secured. Vast fortunes have been made, in full view of the
antitrust laws, by companies that have secured their positions through accident, super
skill, foresight, or industry. Intellectual property law does not create monopolies
with abandon. For a limited amount of the creations of the human mind it establishes
property rights that may result in the owner obtaining and maintaining significant
market power.
We are not suggesting that there is no tension between antitrust laws and
intellectual property laws, only that this tension does not emanate from their having
different objectives. Antitrust cases often involve intellectual property and, as with
all cases, must take into account the circumstances surrounding that property. There
may be ways in which companies can use intellectual property to engage in
anticompetitive behavior beyond those that they can use with physical property.
There are also situations in which the courts need to consider relationships
between antitrust and intellectual property laws. Requiring consumers who buy a
patented product to purchase another product could increase the profits from
invention. The intellectual property issue that is raised by such tying concerns
whether there should be limitations on the ways in which an inventor can secure
profit from his invention and ultimately on his total return. Patent misuse deals with
that question. The antitrust issue that is raised by such tying is whether that is the
sort of practice the antitrust laws should consider prohibiting and if so should it be
89

Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 at 452, 65 S.Ct. 373 (1944), Justice Rutledge claims:
"Basically these [patent laws and antitrust laws] are opposed in policy, the one granting rights of monopoly, the
other forbidding monopolistic activities."
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banned per se or subject to a rule of reason analysis. Given their foundations, an
important consideration for both antitrust and intellectual property law is whether
local costs outweigh global benefits
This example leads to an important point which to turn to next.

VI. CONSUMER AND SOCIAL WELFARE AND THE COMPETITIVE
PROCESS
As we have seen US, and arguably EC, antitrust policy places great value on
the dynamic competitive process in which firms can gain significant market power
through superior skill, foresight, industry, and even accident but places some limits
on how firms play the game. Those limits include cartels and other agreements
among competitors, mergers that result in significant increases in market power, and
some business practices that are deemed to go too far. That is consistent with
policymakers—some combination of the legislators who enacted the laws and the
courts and authorities that have interpreted them—believing that the competitive
struggle among firms, with many dying and some achieving great success,
counterbalanced by light regulation of the excesses, would maximize long-run
economy-wide consumer welfare.90
A.

The boundaries of competition law

Those policy objectives are made operational in two related stages.
In the first stage, legislators and the courts, through the development of case
law, roughly determine the boundaries of the game and a framework for assessing
whether practices cross those boundaries. Sherman Act Section 1 and the Article 81
EC Treaty are reasonably specific that agreements among competitors are highly
suspect although the case law has refined that considerably. The Clayton Act and
Article 82 EC Treaty are specific that certain kinds of business practices such as
90

In the long run there is no meaningful distinction between consumer and social welfare.
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tying are suspect. Sherman Act Section 2 and Article 82 EC Treaty provide a
flexible mechanism for identifying other business practices that are suspect. Over
time several categories have emerged. Some practices move from outside the
boundaries to within as a result of legislative, judicial, or prosecutorial choices.
The courts have also devised general approaches for assessing whether firms
have crossed the boundaries. The U.S. has the per se and rule of reason framework.
The EC has also developed a variety of rules-based approaches although these tend to
be closer to per se condemnation for dominant firms.91 These general approaches
involve the assignment of the burden of proof at various stages of the inquiry.92
In this first stage the courts, in particular, have focused on the long-run
consequence for economic progress of what sorts of competitive practices should be
condemned. It is at this stage that the U.S. and EC courts have confirmed that it is
not unlawful to have a monopoly or to acquire that monopoly through a myriad of
lawful ways.
In the second stage the courts assess whether particular business practices
cross those boundaries and should therefore be deemed violations of the antitrust
laws. That is usually a fact-intensive inquiry within the framework set out in the
first stage. The analysis is usually predicated on a ―relevant antitrust market‖ which
is determined as the first step of the inquiry. Many practices never reach court, for
this second stage, because it has become settled law that they are within the
boundaries of the game of competition. Other business practices have come to be
avoided because it has become settled law that they are outside the boundaries.
The first and second stages are related of course. Especially in common-law
countries it is through numerous fact-intensive inquiries at the lower court level that
the higher courts fashion competition rules. Nonetheless, there is an important
distinction: the development of competition rules and the application of those rules.
Figure 2 describes the role of stage 1 and stage 2 in regulating the competitive game.

91

Evans, supra note 25.

92

United States v. Microsoft Corp., 2001 US App. LEXIS 14324 (DC Cir. June 28, 2001)
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FIGURE 2
ANTITRUST RULES AND THE GAME OF COMPETITION

B.

Consumer Welfare and the Competitive Process
In recent decades the U.S. antitrust community—in particular judges, law

professors, economists, and agency officials—have come to accept the premise that
the antitrust laws have the singular purpose of protecting (or maximizing) consumer
welfare. As a result there has been an attempt in the cases—operating at the second
stage—to make this principle operational by assessing whether particular practices
reduce consumer welfare. An example is the balancing of anti-competitive and procompetitive effects that underlies the application of the rule of reason in U.S. v.
Microsoft by the D.C. Circuit in a decision that has become one of the leading
explications of the rule of reason analysis.93 Some treatments of consumer welfare
examine whether the practices at issue raise price or lower output which are the
drivers of the basic welfare analysis described in Figure 1 and in elementary
economics textbooks.94 Other treatments of consumer welfare focus on whether a

93
94

Id.
Hospital Corporation of America, v. Federal Trade Commission 807 F.2d 1381.
31

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1275431

Preliminary Draft – Do Not Circulate or Circulate

business practice ―harms the competitive process.‖95 Because it is assumed that the
competitive process maximizes consumer welfare it is further assumed that harm to
the competitive process reduces consumer welfare. Consumer welfare and the impact
on the competitive process are usually considered within the context of a relevant
antitrust market.
There approaches result in some confusion both in their application in the
cases and in the literature.
First, it is not the case, for the reasons already discussed, that the overarching
objective of the antitrust laws is to prohibit business practices that reduce consumer
welfare in relevant antitrust markets. It is sensible and often practical to use the
impact on consumer welfare in a relevant market in the second stage of the analysis
as a basis for assessing whether a business practice crosses the boundaries
established in the first stage. But the consumer welfare analysis used in the second
stage is obviously different from the consumer welfare analysis used in the first stage
since many of the practices allowed in the first stage would fail the competitive
effects analysis in the second stage. The market-focused consumer welfare analysis
in the second stage is a tactic for achieving the long-run economy-wide economic
progress that is the focus of the first stage.
Second, the ―competitive process‖ is an empty phrase that can be used to
justify or condemn any business practice. The phrase has no objective meaning in
economics. Economists have developed numerous models of static, and occasionally
dynamic, competition and have used those models to assess how perturbations in
those models would affect consumer and social welfare. Economists generally
recognize that there is a tradeoff between static and dynamic competition. But
economists have not reached any professional consensus on the outline of a specific
competitive process that would maximize consumer or social welfare, nor is it clear
that there is a specific competitive process that would do so. If one could determine
that a practice harmed consumer welfare then one could reasonably define that as
95

Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1183 (1st Cir. 1994); Brooke Group Ltd. v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, (1993).
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harm to the competitive process. But there is no scientific basis for inferring harm to
consumer welfare from the inchoate notion of harm to the competitive process.
―Competitive process‖ is a circular concept within the antitrust laws.
Antitrust policy assumes, as we have seen, that unfettered competition in the market
and for the market is the best approach for achieving economic progress and thus
long-run economy-wide social welfare. The antitrust laws recognize that certain
kinds of competitive practices may interfere with economic progress and therefore
seek boundaries for the competitive game. The competitive process is defined in the
first stage of the analysis above as competition that lies in these boundaries and
therefore does not violate the rules of the game.
We have seen the assertion of harm to the competitive process used as the
core justification of two recent and much discussed Third Circuit opinions on
monopolization, Dentsply and LePage’s. In Dentsply an exclusive dealing contract
between the defendant, an artificial teeth supplier, and dealers was held to have
unlawfully excluded rivals from the market for artificial teeth sales. In LePage’s the
defendant‘s policy of offering bundled discounts was held to have excluded rivals
from access to key distributors. In its Dentsply opinion, the Third Circuit
perceptively noted that both cases involved a similar harm to competitive process,
and treated both cases as requiring similar outcomes in court. The defendant‘s
practices in both cases were viewed as inherently harmful to the competitive process.
Missing in both analyses is an explanation why exclusive dealing contracts and
bundled discounts should not be regarded simply as features of ―the competitive
process‖. Both are potential tools for seeking the undivided loyalty and promotional
efforts of dealers and distributors. These points have been made in the literature,
which is developing a sharper scientific basis for examining the welfare effects of
exclusive dealing and bundled discounts.96 Our point, which is in large part
independent of the ultimate conclusions from the economic literature, is that the
96

Benjamin Klein & Andres Lerner, Procompetitive Justifications for Exclusive Dealing: Preventing Free-Riding
and Creating Undivided Dealer Loyalty (Nov. 6, 2006, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/sectiontwohearings/docs/kleindealerloyalty111206.pdf); Michael Salinger, A Graphical
Analysis of Bundling 68 J. BUS. 85 (1995).
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notion of harm to the competitive process, with no rigorous analysis of local or
global welfare effects, fails as a theoretical rationale for decisions under the antitrust
laws.
Economists are at least in part responsible for sowing this confusion.

VII.

THE ROLE OF ECONOMICS IN COMPETITION POLICY

Modern economics has played a significant role in the development of
antitrust law in the last fifty years. During the 1950s economists and legal scholars
associated with the Chicago School demonstrated that a number of anticompetitive
theories, especially those involving vertical restraints, were not founded on sound
economics.97 Other economists not associated with the Chicago School also started
applying rigorous economic analysis to antitrust law.98 These contributions have led
to considerable refinement in antitrust jurisprudence starting with Sylvania99 in 1977
and leading to Leegin in 2007. Economic analysis is regularly cited in decisions by
the U.S. Supreme Court as well as lower courts and few antitrust cases proceed
without dueling expert economists. Beginning in 1982, the U.S. Department of
Justice started incorporating economic reasoning in its merger guidelines. Today,
economics has become an almost lingua franca for the discussion of competition
policy worldwide. Economics is widely, and correctly in our view, credited with
making antitrust more rigorous and coherent.
There are, however, two limitations on the role that economics can play in
antitrust.
One limitation is purely natural. It results from the fundamental difference
between these two disciplines. Antitrust is a policy implemented through a legal
process in which learning is built from examining different factual circumstances
over time, in which precedents are developed which tend to promote clear and
97

For a summary, see Jean Wegman Burns, Challenging the Chicago School on Vertical Restraints, 2006 UTAH
L. REV. 913 (2006).
98
Einer R. Elhauge, Harvard, Not Chicago: Which Antitrust School Drives Recent Supreme Court Decisions? 3
COMP. POL‘Y INT‘L. 59 (2007)
99
Continental T.V. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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predictable rules of law, and in which making reasoned but ultimately subjective
tradeoffs between local costs and global benefits is fundamental. Economics is a
science that studies the behavior of consumers and businesses in a world of scarce
resources that have alternative uses.100 Industrial organization, the branch of
economics that is most relevant to antitrust, studies the structure of industries and
how firms interact in these industries. It largely rests on analyzing theoretical models
based on certain assumptions and sometimes testing those models against data.
Economic analysis is a valuable input into a judicial process that weighs the value of
alternative sources of evidence and considers tradeoffs that go beyond what any
particular economic model can handle.
The other limitation—and the one we focus on in this section—results from a
mismatch between the necessary focus of antitrust and the chosen focus of the
modern industrial organization literature. The dynamic competitive process and its
role in promoting economic progress are at the heart of antitrust policy. The big
issues in antitrust have to do with whether the global benefits from the competitive
struggle, that may well lead to the creation of significant and durable market power,
are outweighed by local costs that result from the restriction of output in specific
markets. Industrial organization economics has paid little attention to dynamic
competition and, therefore, has had little systematic knowledge to contribute to the
design of antitrust rules at the first stage of antitrust discussed earlier.101
Industrial organization—from the early price theory work by the Chicago
School to the most recent game theory work—largely considers static competition in
a market.102 Assumptions are made about certain aspects of the technology for firms,
the nature of demand, how the firms interact with each other, and other factors. A
model is then developed based on those assumptions and used to examine certain
features of the market. Often the model is used to assess how certain business
100

LIONEL ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE 16 (1945).
That is not to say that economists, and economic-minded judges and lawyers, have not been influential in
expounding on the problems of errors costs and the importance of long-incentives. However, systematic work on
these issues is almost nonexistent in the academic literature.
102
See DENNIS & PERLOFF, supra note 42; JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1988). Of
the 36 chapters of the Handbook of Industrial Organization, only two cover dynamic issues—one on innovation
and the other on entry. HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (R. Schmalensee et al. eds, 2007).
101
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practices affect total welfare in that market. Empirical work may test some of the
implications and assumptions of the model (although the ratio of empirics to theory is
very low). Such models, and much of the empirical analysis, are based on looking at
interactions at a point in time or possibly based on two periods. Longer-run concerns,
including effects on incentives, are generally treated as ―additional considerations‖
but are seldom actual features of the model. Moreover, matters that are important to
judicial rulemaking such as error cost, ease of administration, predictability, and the
indirect consequences on incentives are either ignored or mentioned in passing.
The focus on static competition in the market is not because economists have
a bias against dynamic competition. Modern economics is based largely on
developing mathematical models. It is hard enough to solve the equations of static
models for unique solutions and draw inferences from these equations. Oftentimes
the models are very sensitive to assumptions that have been made about, for example,
the functional relationships between certain variables. The mathematics of dynamic
models is far more challenging and the likelihood that an economist who invests
efforts in such models will achieve a publishable result is lower.103 It is easy to use
words to talk about dynamic competition, as Professor Joseph Schumpeter did so
eloquently, but it is much more difficult to use mathematics.104 When realism and
relevance butt heads with analytical tractability, tractability almost always wins out
in economics.

A.

Tractability Bias
This ―tractability bias‖ leads to ―static competition‖ bias in antitrust

economics. Economists focus on issues that pertain to static competition, not
because they are more important than dynamic competition, but because that is what

103

For a flavor of the complexity of dynamic models see Richard Ericson & Ariel Pakes, Markov-Perfect
Industry Dynamics: A Framework for Empirical Work, 62 REV. ECON. STUD. 53, 53-82 (1995); Hugo A.
Hopenhayn, Entry, Exit, and firm Dynamics in Long Run Equilibrium, 60 ECONOMETRICA 1127 (1992); Boyan
Jovanovic, Selection and the Evolution of Industry, 50 ECONOMETRICA 649, 649-670 (1982).
104
THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHET OF INNOVATION: JOSEPH SCHUMPETER AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION (2007)
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they are able to work out mathematically. This phenomenon is well known in
economics and leads to one of the most popular jokes told by economists about
themselves: the man who drops his keys at night and looks for them under the
streetlamp because the light is better there.
To illustrate the effects of static competition bias we consider the effect of
introducing dynamic considerations into several examples of possibly
anticompetitive conduct. We do this to illustrate the bias and not to advocate any
particular result. Moreover, we are not arguing that the development of more
dynamic models would necessarily provide any basis for changing where the
boundaries for the game of competition are currently drawn or the analysis of
particular cases.
1.

Innovation
Consider the following illustration based in part on Williamson‘s welfare

tradeoff model.105 Suppose a firm monopolizes a market, as shown in Figure 3,
leading to a transfer from consumers of T and a deadweight loss of D. At the same
time, the conduct that led to the monopoly also created efficiencies, with the
efficiency gain represented by E in the diagram. The diagram could describe the
result of an exclusive dealing contract that has the effect of foreclosing market rivals
(by blocking access to a key resource, supplier, or distributor) and at the same time
reducing supply costs.106

105

Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18
(1968).
106
The conduct that both monopolizes and generates efficiencies could take many different forms, such a merger
toward monopoly, as originally analyzed in Williamson‘s tradeoff analysis. Williamson, supra note xx.
Alternatively, the conduct could involve technological innovation, see Steven C. Salop, Exclusionary Conduct,
Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed Profit-Sacrifice Standard, 73 ANTITRUST L. J. 311, 345-46 (2006) (example
of change in product design standard with monopolizing effect).
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FIGURE 3
MONOPOLY, EFFICIENCY, AND CONSUMER WELFARE

One central argument of the Chicago School is that firms should not be
penalized for efficient conduct. Doing so would discourage efficient business
practices, which would reduce total welfare and could reduce consumer welfare as
well. In terms of the welfare tradeoff analysis, this argument implies that the optimal
penalty imposed for monopolization is the sum of the transfer and deadweight loss
components T + D. Faced with having to pay the optimal penalty for
monopolization, a firm would proceed with its monopolizing conduct whenever the
efficiency gain (E) is greater than the deadweight loss imposed on society (D). Thus,
if the adoption of a new product standard reduced production costs and also
permitted a firm to monopolize its market, the firm would have an incentive to go
ahead with the new standard if the profit expected as a result exceeded the total
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welfare loss imposed on consumers – or, equivalently, if the cost savings exceeded
the deadweight loss.
The notion that a monopolist should be penalized an amount that reflects the
static welfare costs of monopolization is accepted among analysts today. Even
Chicago School critics have referred to it as one of the school‘s important lessons for
antitrust.107 But, as insightful as this Chicago School lesson on antitrust punishment
is, it is still based on a static analysis; the welfare tradeoff model does not incorporate
dynamic welfare concerns.
The simplest way to alter the welfare tradeoff model to incorporate the
dynamic element is to consider the incentives that lead to the creation of monopolies.
Suppose that, in the first period, the firm decides whether to invest in some activity
that could create a new market in the second period. In the second period, the firm
decides whether it will adopt some practices that will enable it to monopolize the
new market, depending on expected profits and the penalty, if any, for engaging in
those practices.
For example, suppose in the first period the firm invests in the design and
production of a new artificial tooth that will be ready to market in the second period.
Rival can copy the tooth design easily so the second period market could be highly
competitive. However, the firm could reduce competitive pressure by engaging in
some exclusionary act at the start of the second period. Ideally, it would like to
obtain a legal barrier to entry, such as a patent or a tariff on foreign competitors, but
perhaps such options are not available. The new tooth design may not be patentable
or there may be too few legislators interested in providing protection from
competition to the firm. Suppose the firm‘s best option for excluding competition,
therefore, is entering into an exclusive dealing contract with a key resource supplier.
The returns from the creation of the new artificial tooth depend on the firm‘s later
success in excluding competition. It will have an incentive to monopolize if the
gains from monopolization exceed the expected antitrust penalties.

107

AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1.
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If the firm monopolizes the market, it will impose a welfare loss on
consumers equal to the monopoly transfer and deadweight loss (T +D), and introduce
an efficiency gain (E) in the form of lower supply costs. If the firm is deterred from
monopolizing the market in the second period, it will not impose any welfare losses
on consumers, because the market will be competitive, and it will not generate the
supply-side efficiency gain.
In this alternative ―dynamic‖ description of monopolization, the firm‘s
investment creates the market. The anticipation of an antitrust penalty would
diminish its incentive to invest in the activity that creates the market—the new
artificial tooth. More generally, the antitrust penalty has dynamic welfare
consequences because it could suppress the creation of new products such as this and
therefore lead to the loss of the significant social wealth created from new
products.108 That is not to say that there should not be an antitrust penalty, only that
the optimal penalty must consider the dynamic consequences.
Consider the private and social returns from investment for the would-be
monopolist, on the assumption that it invests and later monopolizes the newlycreated market. The private return to the firm would be the monopoly transfer and
the efficiency gain (T +E). The social return from investment would be the residual
consumer surplus after monopolization, the transfer, and the efficiency gain (W + T +
E). A penalty assessed against the firm for monopolizing imposes a dynamic welfare
cost because it could deny society (consumers especially) the residual surplus (W).
In view of this, an optimal penalty for monopolization would include , to some
degree, a bounty equal to the residual surplus to bring the private and social returns
from innovation closer to each other.
An optimal antitrust penalty that includes a bounty equal to the residual
surplus could easily be zero or negative. In other words, it may not be optimal to
punish the monopolist at all when dynamic incentive effects are taken into account.
The static punishment setting would require the optimal penalty to be set equal to the
108

The value of new products equals roughly the area between the demand schedule and the cost schedule while
the deadweight cost of monopoly is ordinarily a small fraction of the area between the demand schedule and the
cost schedule.
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sum of the transfer and deadweight loss (T + D). The dynamic punishment setting
would require the optimal penalty to internalize the sum of the transfer and
deadweight loss minus the residual surplus (T + D – W).109 If the residual surplus is
greater than the transfer and deadweight loss amounts, the optimal penalty for
monopolization may not be positive. It is this sort of reasoning that, at least
implicitly, has led the legislatures and the courts to allow many business practices
that can lead to monopoly. We are not advocating lower scrutiny for any particular
practice. Rather, we are observing that static economic models do not take these
considerations into account and therefore provide, at best, incomplete information to
those who are designing competition rules.
In this example, we have assumed that the monopolist has created a new
market. If, in fact, the monopolist‘s investment did not create or enhance a market,
the standard static analysis – internalize the transfer and deadweight loss – would
remain valid. So if the monopolist in this story devoted his entire investment to
designing a more efficient way to transfer surplus from consumers, then there would
be no case for taking a more lenient approach to punishment.
But if the monopolist creates a new market, which is the core example of the
dynamic welfare benefit of innovation, the welfare gain to consumers is substantial
even when the firm monopolizes the market it has created. The same can be said of
investment that expands a market. In these innovation scenarios, which we think are
common in real world markets and go well beyond innovation that is the subject of
intellectual property laws, the static welfare tradeoff analysis is no longer the best
source for an optimal regulatory policy.
Admittedly dynamic models are complicated. The optimal antitrust penalty
in our dynamic scenario is a messier rule than the optimal static penalty. But this
does not imply that the static model should be applied as the sole source for policy
recommendations in settings in which dynamic competitive effects are present.

109

The optimal penalty formula is more complicated because it depends on the probability of monopolization
following investment.
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2.

Entry
As another illustration consider the economic analysis of the coordinated

effects of mergers. Under the coordinated effects theory, mergers can be harmful to
consumer welfare because they may facilitate collusion. Modern economic analysis
of the coordinated effects builds on the modern analysis of collusion. Jonathan
Baker provides an especially clear and straightforward presentation.110 Let P be the
coordinated price and i(P) represent the per unit profit of firm i evaluated at the
collusive price. The firm‘s profit in any period at the collusive price is i(P)qi(P). If
the firm cheats, setting its price just under P, it produces at its capacity ki. The firm
will avoid detection for T periods, after which the industry price falls to the zeroprofit level as punishment. The firm will prefer to remain in the collusive network
rather than cheat if the discounted value of the stream of profits from collusion is
greater than the discounted value of the stream of profits from cheating. Thus, if the
firm‘s discount rate is , it will prefer to collude rather than cheat if [ i(P)qi(P)]/(1- )
> [ i(P)kiT(1-

T

)]/(1- ).

Under the modern analysis of coordinated effects, coordination may be
hampered by the existence of a firm for which the discounted value of profits from
collusion is equal to the discounted value of profits from cheating. These firms have
been referred to as mavericks.111
Suppose a firm within the collusive network chooses to acquire a maverick.
Such a merger can reduce consumer welfare by eliminating the pricing constraint
imposed by the maverick‘s existence. This analysis has led to the suggestion that if
the market is conducive to coordination, the acquisition of maverick firms should
establish a presumption of harm to competition.112
As is well known, entry constrains prices, as does the existence of maverick
firms. Any policy that eliminates mavericks and permits the collusive price P to be
110

Jonathan B. Baker, Market Concentration in the Antitrust Analysis of Horizontal Mergers, in ANTITRUST LAW
& ECONOMICS (Keith Hylton, ed. forthcoming 2009)
111
Jonathan B.Baker & Carl Shapiro, Reinvigorating Horizontal Merger Enforcement 35 (Oct. 2007, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=991588).
112
Id.
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maintained also enhances the incentive to enter and undercut the collusive price. Of
course, the coordinated-effects analysis assumes that entry is not attractive at the
collusive price, otherwise it would have occurred. Thus, no entry occurs at the
collusive price because the expected profits from undercutting the collusive price are
less than the cost of entry.
This analysis of coordinated effects suggests that entry incentives are greater
than under a model that ignores the effects of mergers. Presumably the firms within
the collusive network would prefer a merger over charging the competitive price in
all future periods. But doing so would be a bad policy for them because it would
undermine the threat of punishment. Each prospective entrant therefore knows that it
should enter not as a ―cheater‖ (which would not be profitable anyway) but as a
maverick firm. Entering as a maverick is potentially attractive because it allows the
new firm to gain the same profits as from cheating (which are insufficient to cover
the entry cost) plus the option value of the merger. And given the consistent finding
that acquiring firms pay a substantial premium over the market, the share of the
merged entity‘s profits going to the entrant should be assumed to exceed the entrant‘s
contribution to the merged entity‘s profits. As the merger option‘s value to the
entrant increases, the cost of entry loses its relevance as a constraint on entry
incentives in this analysis.
The prospect of a merger, in this analysis, is like a golden parachute for the
entering firm. A policy of acquiring troublesome mavericks, in order to maintain the
collusive equilibrium, calls forth more prospective mavericks.113 Mergers with
potential coordinated effects induce entry.
We are not proposing that either of these dynamic extensions is complete or
should be used to modify current competition rules. Rather, the point is that dynamic
considerations are important, courts and legislatures consider them implicitly, and
modern economic models often do not.
113

The policy of acquiring mavericks encourages entry. There is also the more obvious argument that the threat
of entry is a function of the coordinated price. If the acquisition policy is implemented, and the pricing constraint
of the maverick removed, the firms might move to higher coordinated price. The decision to move to a higher
coordinated price level could induce entry. Entry was not desirable at the initial coordinated price, which was
constrained by the maverick. But after the acquisition policy is put into effect, this changes and the threat of entry
may become sufficient to prevent coordination at a higher price.
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B.

The Static-ization of Antitrust

Economists are playing an increasing role in antitrust. Many of the antitrust
scholars writing on antitrust are economists, economic analysis is playing an
increasingly important role in antitrust authorities, and it is not uncommon in
countries around the world for economists to head the antitrust authority.114 By and
large economists have helped improve antitrust analysis considerably. A downside to
the increased role of economists is the possible infection of antitrust with ―tractability
bias‖— an excessive focus on static competition simply because that is what
economists are most at ease in analyzing, as the parable of the keys emphasizes.
The excellent survey of the economic principles of antitrust by Kaplow and
Shapiro illustrates the bias.115 They examine the economic underpinnings of market
power, collusion, merger, and monopolization. Every model they present is based on
static competition within a relevant antitrust market. There is no formal analysis of,
and but a few afterthoughts, on dynamic considerations. The local versus global
tradeoff that underlies modern antitrust is largely neglected. This same statement is
true for every major treatment of antitrust by economists that we know of.116 These
models therefore provide some utility for the application of competition rules
adopted by the courts and some information that is relevant for the development of
competition rules. But if a judge wanted to know whether any particular business
practice should fall on one side or the other of the boundaries for the game of
competition she would not find the answer—or even much of what she would need to
know to make an informed judgment—in the modern industrial organization
literature.

114

For example, the former European Commissioner in charge of antirust was an economics professor and the
current one has her undergraduate degree in economics and no law degree. The current and past heads of the
UK‘s Office of Fair Trade were economics professors. Economists are or recently served in top positions at
authorities in Brazil, South Korea, and Mexico.
115
Louis Kaplow & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust (Harvard Law and Econ. Discussion Paper No. 575, 2007), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=961264.
116
Other superb expositions of modern antitrust economics have the same bias. See e.g., WHINSTON, supra note
66; MOTTA, supra note 3; HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS (Paolo Buccirossi ed.) (2008).
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If the economic approach to antitrust were only of academic interest the
tractability bias would be of no concern. However, the static economic approach is
becoming infused in the practice of antitrust. This has become most apparent in the
analysis of unilateral effects for Section 2 and Article 82. Most of the economic
analysis related to determining the scope of antitrust rules concerning unilateral
practices concerns competing models of largely static competition. The global
benefits of unfettered competition largely get introduced through discussions of error
costs.117
For antitrust enforcement in the United States, there is some irony here.
Posner lamented years ago that lawyers dominated enforcement decisions within the
antitrust enforcement agencies, allowing economists to serve largely as
handmaidens.118 The critique of enforcement as excessively lawyer-driven led to the
belief that better enforcement decisions would be made if economists played a
greater role in reviewing antitrust enforcement decisions.119 Circumstances have
changed and economists now play important roles in the enforcement agencies, and
some improvements have resulted. Perhaps the most important is a shift away from
reliance on subjective intent evidence and toward the use of objective and empirical
evidence of consumer harm.120 However, because of the tendency to focus on static
welfare models at the expense of dynamic competition, the enhanced stature of
economists in the federal enforcement agencies may be not be sufficient to lead to a
substantial improvement in the quality of enforcement decisions.
Outside of the United States antitrust law is largely enforced by competition
authorities with limited judicial oversight. In the European Community, for example,
117

Evans and Padilla argue that firms are likely to be reluctant to implement alternative businesses practices that
replicate the one found anticompetitive (such as price competition and tying), as such practices are likely to also
be found anticompetitive. See David S. Evans & A. Jorge Padilla, Designing Antitrust Rules for Assessing
Unilateral Practices: A Neo-Chicago Approach, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 73 (2005); for a basic static model that
considers unilateral effects see Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis, 80
AM. ECON. REV. 107 (1990).
118
Richard A. Posner, A Program for the Antitrust Division, 38 U. CHI L. REV. 500, 533 (1971).
119
See FRANKLIN FISHER ET. AL., FOLDED, SPINDLED, AND MUTILATED: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND U.S. V. IBM 348
(1983).
120
Fisher complained that the case against IBM seemed to be based largely on evidence of subjective intent found
in company memoranda. Id. at 347. Today, internal memoranda and emails are still used to suggest
anticompetitive intent, but they are seldom the focus of a case.
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the Commission acts as investigator, prosecutor, and judge. Its decisions can be
appealed but the higher level courts defer to its findings of facts especially those
involving complex economic assessments. The static-ization of antitrust is
particularly problematic in these jurisdictions. Static economic analysis forms the
basis for guidelines that provide the framework for assessing whether particular
business practices violate the rules.121
The static focus of modern industrial organization is a problem both for itself
as a branch of economic science and as a body of knowledge that is relevant to the
big issues within antitrust. The academic literature needs to move from the static to
the dynamic within markets and from the effects of policies within markets to the
effects of policies for long-term economic progress. That will require a change in the
reward systems in academic economics. The economic profession will need to
provide a premium to researchers who work on dynamic competition and one that
either compensates them for the especially hard mathematical work necessary for
robust dynamic models or provides bonus points that skew incentives towards less
mathematical dynamic analysis and away from highly technical, clever, and
irrelevant static analysis.

VIII. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The recognition of the importance of monopoly in promoting economic
progress has been a key part of antitrust policy since its inception and is implicitly
recognized in US and EC law, which are the foundations for most global competition
policy. However, there seems to have been great confusion on this point in the
literature, perhaps most readily seen in the debate over the tension between IP and
antitrust law and the role of antitrust and the new economy. This confusion seems to
have resulted, ironically, from the increased role of modern economic analysis in the
law which has imparted a bias towards static analysis. The US, EC, and other
jurisdictions around the world should avoid attempts to turn antitrust into a branch of
121

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM‘N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, (1992, Revised 1997)
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static consumer welfare maximization. At the same time economists should spend
more effort understanding how the pursuit of monopoly power affects long-run
economic progress and the role of antitrust policy in this competition for the market.
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